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In this paper we develop a vintage capital model for a firm involved in a market for tradable emission 
permits. We analyze both the firm’s optimal investment plans and the market equilibrium. This allows us 
to scrutinize how firms use permits free endowment, and to highlight the implications of non-optimal uses 
both at the firm and at the market level. We provide a new rationale for the market of tradable permits not 
to be cost-efficient. The novel technical points in this context are the use a distributed (vintage) optimal 
control model of the firm, the use of optimality conditions for non-smooth problems, and the involvement 
of a nonlinear Fredholm integral equation of the first kind for the description of the equilibrium price of 
permits, and its practical meaning for market regularization. 
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Markets for tradable emission permits have become a key policy instrument in many environmental
areas today. One may naturally have in mind the US acid rain program, that launched in 1995 a
market for SO2 permits covering the whole US power industry (see Ellerman et al., 2000). Even
broader, the Kyoto protocol enforced a world market under the United Nations Framework Conven-
tion on Climate Change (UNFCCC, 1997; see UNFCCC, 2005, for a survey). In 2005 the European
Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) entered into force, covering about 14,000 industrial installa-
tions in the EU-27 (see Ellerman et al., 2007). In the US, the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative
also makes use of tradable emission permits.1 Many more local markets have been implemented
recently, see Ellerman (2005) or Tietenberg and Thoman (2006) for comprehensive presentations
of all these experiments.
The idea of tradable emission permits originates to Dales (1968). Montgomery (1972) formally
showed that trading is cost-eﬃcient under perfect competition. Another key result of Montgomery
is that the way permits are distributed among ﬁrms does not alter the eﬃciency of the market for
tradable permits. This result oﬀers a major advantage to tradable emission permits: the authority
responsible for issuing the permits needs not be aware of the incumbents’ abatement costs. In this
paper we will question the result that markets for tradable permits are cost-eﬃcient.2
Another crucial issue about tradable emission permits is to know whether permits should be given
for free (i.e. grand-fathered) or auctioned. The economic literature is quite clear on that point:
giving permits for free is not socially optimal, while full auctioning is (see e.g. Cramton and Kerrn,
2002, Jouvet et al., 2005). Nevertheless, as argued by Stavins (1998), giving some permits for free
enhances political acceptability because it is less costly for the ﬁrms (see Goulder, 2002, for a
CGE numerical appraisal and Br´ echet et al., 2010, for a critical discussion in dynamic general
equilibrium.). The policy maker has thus some good reasons to issue some permits for free, the
remainder being auctioned. In this paper we highlight some potential adverse eﬀects of giving
permits for free both at the ﬁrm and at the market level.
To our knowledge, there is no paper in the literature that explicitly considers how permits are
managed inside the ﬁrm, and no paper that analyzes the related impacts on market equilibrium.
How do ﬁrms use emission permits? Do they consider diﬀerently free endowments and auctioned
permits? How does it change their investment plans? In this paper we answer these questions.
To this purpose we develop a vintage capital model of the ﬁrm. In all of the works that analyze
1The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative (RGGI) is the ﬁrst mandatory, market-based eﬀort in the United States
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. Ten Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states haved capped and will reduce CO2
emissions from the power sector 10% by 2018. See http://www.rggi.org.
2We will do it under perfect competition. Hahn (1984) elaborated on that point under imperfect competition by
showing that the ﬁrms’ permit endowments could be used to control for market power. A large literature is also
devoted to revelation mechanisms under information asymmetry. See e.g. Moledina et al. (2003). This is beyond the
purpose of our paper.
2tradable emission permits, it is assumed that capital is homogeneous.3 We will be able to analyze
how free endowments of tradable emission permits are used inside the ﬁrm by distinguishing capital
vintages with respect to their productivity and emission intensity. This heterogeneity enables the
ﬁrm’s managers to decide which machines to scrap and which machines to buy, when confronted
with emission restrictions. In particular, our model allows for investing in and scrapping technologies
of any vintage.
Formally, our ﬁrm-level model consists of a continual family of controlled ordinary diﬀerential
equations (thus has a distributed dynamics) describing the evolution of the ﬁrm vintage-wise.
From a technical point of view the vintage diﬀerentiation does not cause problems at all, since
the AK-framework that we employ, does not include vintage-externalities and evidently allows to
decompose the ﬁrm’s optimization problem to independent subproblems corresponding to diﬀerent
vintages. The main trouble with the ﬁrm-level problem is caused by the possibility of endogenous
scrapping (which is necessary to include as a policy instrument when the ﬁrm faces emission costs
of any kind).4 The resulting ﬁrm’s optimization problem involves a non-diﬀerentiable term in the
objective functions, which makes the problem intractable by the standard dynamic optimization
techniques based on the Pontryagin maximum principle (Pontryagin et al., 1962). We apply an
optimality condition for non-smooth optimal control problems (Loewen, 1993) and perform the
relevant analysis.
Another technically interesting point is the equation for the equilibrium price of emissions that we
derive based on the obtained optimal behaviour of the ﬁrms facing costs of emission. The market
equation can be classiﬁed as a nonlinear Fredholm integral equation of the ﬁrst kind, which reduces
to a classical linear one under additional assumptions. This already says a lot: the equilibrium price
of emission permits may be very sensitive, non-uniquely determined or even not having economic
meaning (being negative). Therefore we address the question of regularization of this equation in
a way that is practically implementable. The main idea is that the emission restriction should be
posed period-wise, with not too short commitment periods. This sort of regularization is consistent
with the discussion about so-called commitment period under the Kyoto protocol (2008-2012), or
the so-called “phases” under the EU-ETS market (2005-2008, then 2009-2013). We show that a
long enough commitment period is essential for ﬁrms to implement eﬃcient investment plans.
Our main results can be summarized as follows. We start by considering the benchmark model of a
ﬁrm that uses machines of diﬀerent vintages (in other words, diﬀerent technologies). Each technol-
ogy has its own productivity and emission intensity. We naturally assume that older machines are
more polluting but less productive. At any time the ﬁrm can invest in machines of any vintage and
switch-oﬀ any machines. The ﬁrm faces an emission tax. It maximizes its discounted net revenue.
The optimal investment decision is described. This ﬁrst model allows us to understand part of the
3The only paper dealing with CO2 emissions abatement with heterogenous capital stocks is Jaccard and Rivers
(2007). This paper explores the relationship between the natural turn-over for diﬀerent society’s capital stocks (in-
frastructures, building and machines) and the pace of emission abatement, but it does not consider the role of policy
instruments.
4We refer to Boucekkine et al. (1998) for “creative destruction” of capital in a diﬀerent context and with a diﬀerent
technique applied.
3ﬁrm behavior with emission permits, because in both cases (emission tax or permits), the price of
emissions plays the same role. It represents the opportunity cost of pollution for the ﬁrm. Then,
we introduce tradable emission permits. For the sake of generality we assume that the regulator
issues some permits for free, and that some are auctioned. We consider that there exists a top
manager in the ﬁrm who distributes the free endowment of permits among the diﬀerent technolo-
gies. By doing this, she decentralizes the investment and production decisions at the level of the
operating manager. The ﬁrm is supposed to be price taker in the market for tradable permits. We
show that there exists a set of optimal allocation rules of permits, that is, ones that maximize the
ﬁrm’s intertemporal revenue. In other words, there is not one single optimal allocation rule among
machines. This result is important as it shows that there exists room for ﬂexibility within the ﬁrm
about how to manage the free endowment.
In order to study market equilibrium, the issue of regularization needs to be tackled. As mentioned
just above, we show that the market equilibrium may not be well-deﬁned if the commitment periods
are too short. In economic terms this means that the length of the commitment period must ﬁt
the ﬁrms’ planning horizon. The longer the ﬁrm’s planning horizon(like in the steel, cement, lime,
power industry), the longer the commitment period should be. We provide numerical analysis for
this question. If the commitment period is not long enough, then the ﬁrm cannot adapt optimally
to the regulation, which leads to market failures.
Another unanswered question in the literature is the following. Will a ﬁrm, facing a forthcoming
emission restrictions at some later time period, change its investment plan in advance? Put diﬀer-
ently, may one expect some anticipation eﬀect? We show that there exists an anticipation eﬀect
and that, due to this eﬀect, ﬁrm’s emissions decrease even before the mandatory time period. This
provides a rationale why the EU-ETS was actually non-binding during its ﬁrst phase. By simulation
we show that the anticipation eﬀect is associated with an overshoot in the market price, which is
followed by a sharp drop. There is a wide debate about the ﬁrst phase of the EU-ETS, because the
emission price collapsed to almost zero after some time. This was interpreted by some authors as
an evidence for over-allocation of permits (see Ellerman et al., 2007). We claim that, even if it is
not the only cause, the price collapse partially happened because of the anticipation eﬀect.
Maybe even more important are the implications of a non-optimal use of the free endowment of
permits inside the ﬁrm. We analyze the implications of the fact that a ﬁrm may not follow an optimal
allocation rule. First, it may lead to a higher emission level for that ﬁrm, for some time periods,
which is costly. Second, it may also have severe implications at the market level. In equilibrium the
marker price for tradable permits may increase w.r.t. the eﬃcient price, which is detrimental to all
ﬁrms in the market. The ﬁrms that behave optimally will face a higher permit price, and thus will
abate more. The ﬁrms that behave non-optimally will suﬀer twice.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we solve the ﬁrm’s optimal investment under emission
tax. In Section 3 we present and investigate a reasonable scenario of non-optimal utilization of free
endowments by a ﬁrm facing exogenous price of emissions. Section 4 is devoted to the equation for
the equilibrium price of emission permits, reproducing in short the investigation of a companion
conference paper (Br´ echet et al., 2009). The anticipation eﬀect is presented in Section 5, and the
4paper is concluded by Section 6, where we analyze how the non-optimal use of free endowments by
some ﬁrms inﬂuences the equilibrium price of emission permit and impacts the other ﬁrms in the
market.
2 The ﬁrm’s problem with an emission tax
The model of the ﬁrm presented below is a version of the PDE-vintage models introduced by Barucci
and Gozzi (1998), Barucci and Gozzi (2001), and further investigated and applied in a large number
of contributions (see Feichtinger et al. (2006), Feichtinger et al. (2008) and the literature therein).
The formal diﬀerence of our model with the abovementioned ones is technical and not essential
from a methodological point of view.
First we describe the basic model of a ﬁrm that is composed of machines of diﬀerent vintages
(technologies) τ: K(τ,s) will denote the capital stock of vintage τ and of age s. That is, K(τ,t−τ)
is the stock of vintage τ that exists at time t ≥ τ. The maximal life-time of machines of each
technology will be denoted by ω, and the depreciation rate of each technology – by δ. Both are
assumed independent of the vintage just for notational convenience. At any time t > 0 the ﬁrm may
invest with intensity I(τ,s) in machines of vintage τ that are of age s at time t (so that s = t−τ).
The planning horizon of the ﬁrm is [0,∞), therefore the stock of machines of vintage τ ∈ [−ω,0]
which are present in the ﬁrm at time t = 0 is considered as exogenous and will be denoted by K0(τ).
These machines have age −τ at time t = 0 and may be in use until they reach age ω. Machines of
vintage τ > 0 may be in use for ages s ∈ [0,ω], and their stock at age zero equals zero. Therefore
K0(τ) will be deﬁned as zero for τ > 0. The ages of possible use of any vintage can be written as
[s0(τ),ω], where s0(τ) = max{0,−τ}.
Summarizing, the dynamics of each vintage τ ∈ [−ω,∞) is given by the equation
˙ K(τ,s) = −δK(τ,s) + I(τ,s), K(τ,s0(τ)) = K0(τ), s ∈ [s0(τ),ω], (1)
where “dot” means everywhere the derivative with respect to s (the argument representing the
age).
The productivity of machines of vintage τ is denoted by f(τ), while g(τ) denotes the emission per
machine of vintage τ. The ﬁrm faces costs due to emissions at an exogenous price v(t) per unit of
emission (this price will be endogenized later on). Due to this cost the ﬁrm may decide to (possibly
temporarily) switch oﬀ a part of the machines. Let us denote by W(τ,s) ∈ [0,1] the fraction of the
machines of vintage τ that operate at age s.
The cost of investment I in s years old machines of any vintage will be denoted by C(s,I).
5The present value (at time t = 0) of the total production of machines of vintage τ, discounted with























e−rs [(f(τ) − v(τ + s)g(τ))K(τ,s)W(τ,s) − C(s,I(τ,s))] ds dτ (2)
subject to (1).




g(τ)K(τ,t − τ)W(τ,t − τ)dτ. (3)
Remark 1 Due to the speciﬁc form of the problem there is an easy way to deﬁne optimality even
though the optimal value in (2) may be inﬁnite. Namely (I∗,W∗,K∗) is a solution of (2), (1) if for
any T > 0 the restriction of these functions to DT = {(τ,s) : τ ∈ [−ω,T], s ∈ [s0(τ),ω]} is an
optimal solution of the problem in which the integration in (2) is carried out on DT.
Problem (2), (1) ﬁts to the general framework of heterogeneous optimal control systems developed
in Veliov (2008). However, the present problem can be treated also by the classical Pontryagin
optimality conditions for ODEs since it decomposes along vintages: every technology vintage τ ∈





e−rs [(f(τ) − v(τ + s)g(τ))k(s)w(s) − C(s,i(s))] ds (4)
subject to
˙ k(s) = −δk(s) + i(s), k(s0(τ)) = K0(τ), s ∈ [s0(τ),ω]. (5)
If for any ﬁxed τ ∈ [−ω,∞) the triple (i( ),w( ),k( )) = (I(τ, ),W(τ, ),K(τ, )) is a solution of
this problem, then (I,W,K) is a solution of (2), (1) and vice versa.5
5 This is not a self-evident fact, but can easily be proven in natural space settings for the two problems and on
the assumptions made below.
6The following is assumed throughout the paper.
(A1) The exogenous data K0, f, g are non-negative and continuous, f and g are continuously
diﬀerentiable, g > 0, f′ > 0, g′ ≤ 0, r ≥ 0, δ ≥ 0;
(A2) The cost function C(s,i) is two times diﬀerentiable in i, the derivatives C′
i and C′′
ii are
continuous in (s,i), C(s,0) = 0, C′
i(s,0) ≥ 0, C′′
ii ≥ εC > 0;
(A3) The price of emission, v( ), is a measurable bounded function6.
Under these conditions problem (2), (1) has an unique solution (I∗[v],W∗[v],K∗[v]). The corre-
sponding emission given by (3) will be denoted by E∗[v].
Since W enters only in the objective function, clearly we have
W∗[v](τ,s) =
 
0 if f(τ) − v(τ + s)g(τ) ≤ 0,
1 if f(τ) − v(τ + s)g(τ) > 0.
(6)
The optimal control i∗ of problem (4), (5) for a ﬁxed τ and v( ) is easy to obtain by applying the
Pontryagin maximum principle (Pontryagin et al., 1962). Namely,
i∗(s) =
 
0 if ξ∗(s) < C′
i(s,0),
(C′
i)−1(s,ξ∗(s)) if ξ∗(s) ≥ C′
i(s,0),
(7)
where ξ −→ (C′
i)−1(s,ξ) is the inverse of the function i −→ C′
i(s,i) and ξ∗(s) is the unique solution
of the adjoint equation
˙ ξ(s) = (r + δ)ξ(s) − (f(τ) − v(τ + s)g(τ))w∗(s), ξ(ω) = 0. (8)
According to (6) the solution ξ is nonnegative, hence (C′
i)−1(s,ξ∗(s)) is well deﬁned due to (A2).
3 The ﬁrm’s problem with tradable emission permits
In this section we introduce a model of a ﬁrm that participates to a market of tradable emission
permits, a so-called cap-and-trade system. Each permit allows the ﬁrm to emit one unit of pollution,
and the ﬁrm is legally bound to cover all its polluting emissions by the corresponding number of
permits. We assume a competitive market. Each ﬁrm is thus price-taker and the permit price is
exogenous to it. The emission permits can be issued by the regulator in two ways: some amount of
permits is given for free to the ﬁrms, another amount is auctioned. The confrontation between the
permits supply (decided by the regulator) and demand (coming from the ﬁrms which need permits
for their polluting activity) constitutes the primary permits market. The total amount of permits
issued corresponds to the global emission cap in the economy. In such a market, the regulator
controls the total amount of pollution, but not the price of permits, which will be determined by
market equilibrium.
6 For reasons that will become clear later we formally allow for negative values of v(t).
7Because some ﬁrms also receive free endowments of emission permits, the question about how it
will use this endowment is asked. This is the question addressed in this section. Before entering
this analysis, the functioning of the secondary market has to be explained. The secondary market
is the one in which ﬁrms trade emission permits between themselves, the total amount of permits
being given. If, at a given price, a ﬁrm has too many permits because of the free endowment it
received, it can sell them on the secondary market. If the ﬁrm has is lacking permits, then it will
be a buyer. When buying permits on the secondary market, the ﬁrm behaves exactly like during
the auction in the primary market or when facing an emission tax.
Let us now turn back to the free endowment of emission permits received by the ﬁrm. We shall
consider that this endowment is distributed among the diﬀerent technologies used by the ﬁrm. This
distribution is the responsibility of the top manager. Associated to each technology, there exists
an operating manager whose job is to operate the machine eﬃciently. The operating manager is
now allowed to sell the permits, this is the responsibility of the top manager. This situation reﬂects
the dichotomy observed in reality between the operating staﬀ in charge of the production services
of the ﬁrm, and the ﬁnancial staﬀ (here represented by our top manager) in charge of buying or
selling of the emission permits. By distributing the free endowment at the machine level, the top
manager simply delegates the operating of the technology, as it is done with an emission tax, for
example. The issue of how emission permits are used inside the ﬁrm, at the technology level, has
never been addressed in the literature because it requires a non-homogeneous capital stock.
We will see that the way the free endowment of permits is distributed among the diﬀerent technolo-
gies may have severe implications for the ﬁrm. Technically, in our model the possibly “non-optimal”
use (to be deﬁned here below) of the free endowment comes from an internal mechanism of dis-
tribution of the permits among the diﬀerent production units, represented by the vintage of the
corresponding technologies.
We proceed with the formal description of the above two-level decision scheme practiced by many
large ﬁrms. The central management distributes the received free endowment D(t) among the
diﬀerent technologies (i.e. production units) in order to decentralize the investment and production
decisions at the level of the operating manager. Let d(τ,s) be the endowment that technology τ
obtains at time τ + s (when this technology is s years old), so that
  t
t−ω
d(τ,t − τ)dτ = D(t). (9)
The above expression for the free endowment comes from the fact that, at time t, only machines
of vintages τ ∈ [t − ω,t] exist, and the machines of vintage τ are of age s = t − τ.
The operating managers may require from the top manager additional permits (should this be
proﬁtable, given the market price) that the ﬁrm will buy in the secondary market at price v(t).





e−rs [f(τ)k(s)w(s) − v(τ + s)max{0, g(τ)k(s)w(s) − d(τ,s)} − C(s,i(s))] ds,
(10)
8subject to (5). This objective function takes into account that the ﬁrm buys additional permits for
the technology τ at age s only if its emission exceeds the free endowment d(τ,s).
As before, (I∗,W∗,K∗) will be the solution of the ﬁrm-level problem (2), (1), or equivalently,
(i∗( ),w∗( ),k∗( )) = (I∗(τ, ),W∗(τ, ),K∗(τ, )) will be the solution of (4), (5) for any ﬁxed τ. Note
that the dependence of the solution (also of the resulting emission E∗) on the price v is suppressed
in the notations used in this section since v is considered as given.
Below in this section we assume the following.
(A4) The exogenous price v is non-negative and continuous from the right.7
The next proposition claims that the top management of the ﬁrm can always choose the part of
the free endowment necessary to meet the ﬁrm’s needs and the distribution of this endowment
among the technologies in such a way that the decentralized optimal decisions of the diﬀerent
technology managers coincide with the optimal solution at the ﬁrm level, (I∗,W∗,K∗). We call
such a distribution d of the free endowment an optimal distribution. Suﬃcient conditions for a
distribution to be optimal are given in the next proposition, that later will turn out to be also
necessary if a mild additional assumption is fulﬁlled.
Proposition 1 Let (A1), (A2) and (A4) hold. Then
(i) If d(τ,s) ≥ 0 is a measurable function that satisﬁes the inequality
d(τ,s) ≤ g(τ)K∗(τ,s)W∗(τ,s) ∀τ ∈ [−ω,∞), ∀s ∈ [s0(τ),ω], (11)
then (I∗(τ, ),W∗(τ, ),K∗(τ, )) is the unique optimal solution of problem (10), (5) for technology
of vintage τ.
(ii) For every measurable function D(t) that satisﬁes the inequality D(t) ≤ E∗(t) there exists a
measurable d(τ,s) such that both (9) and (11) are fulﬁlled.
The inequality D(t) ≤ E∗(t) means that if the ﬁrm has more free endowments than what is required
at the optimal emission level (the one with no free endowment) at the given price v( ), then the
permits in excess should be sold on the secondary market. Inequality (11) means that the central
manager of the ﬁrm should not give to any technology and at any time more free endowment than
the optimal emission level of this technology for the given v( ). We mention also that a function
d for which claim (ii) holds is explicitly given in the proof, but in general the choice of d is not
unique.
Proof. First we prove the second claim. A function d that is claimed to exist can be deﬁned (in





7 The latter assumption is made for technical convenience. It means that ˆ v may have discontinuities, but
lims→t, s>t ˆ v(s) = ˆ v(t).
9(in the degenerate case E∗(τ +s) = 0 one can merely take d(τ,s) = 0). Due to (3) and D(τ +s) ≤
E∗(τ +s) it is straightforward that (9) and (11) hold true. The measurability of d follows from the
measurability of W∗, which in its turn follows from (6).8
To prove the ﬁrst claim we take any d satisfying (11) and notice that (i∗( ),w∗( ),k∗( )) =





e−rs [(f(τ) − v(τ + s)g(τ))k(s)w(s) + v(τ + s)d(τ,s) − C(s,i(s))] ds (12)
subject to (5), since v(τ+s)d(τ,s) is just an additive exogenous term. The optimal objective value of
(10), (5) cannot be higher than that in the last problem above, since the integrand in the objective
function (10) is majorized by that in (12).
On the other hand (i∗,w∗,k∗) is an admissible solution of (10), (5), and due to (11) the maximum
in the integral in (10) is achieved at the second argument of the “max”, g(τ)k∗(s)w∗(s) − d(τ,s).
Then the corresponding objective value is the same as in (12), which implies that (i∗,w∗,k∗) is
an optimal solution to (10), (5). The uniqueness can be proven from the strict concavity of the
objective function as a function of the control i. Q.E.D.
What would happen if the free endowment is not used optimally? We can now turn to the investi-
gation of the consequences of a distribution d of the free endowment D(t) for which condition (11)
is not satisﬁed. These consequences are summarized in the following proposition.9
Proposition 2 Let (A1), (A2) and (A4) hold. Then for every τ ≥ 0 it holds that:
(i) Whatever is the measurable function d(τ,s) ≥ 0, the solution (kd,id,wd) of (10), (5) (for the
ﬁxed τ) satisﬁes
kd(s) ≥ k∗(s), id(s) ≥ i∗(s), wd(s) ≥ w∗(s). (13)
(ii) Assume that for all τ ≥ 0 the function d(τ, ) is non-negative, piece-wise continuous and one-
sided continuous10 and that i∗(s) > 0 at least for all suﬃciently small s. If the inequality (11) is
violated for some ¯ s ∈ (s0(τ),ω] for which w∗(¯ s) = 1 and v(τ +s) > 0 for s in a neighbourhood of ¯ s,
then the ﬁrst two of the above inequalities are strict for the ﬁxed τ and all s from a non-degenerate
subinterval of [s0(τ),ω].
We mention that the assumption that i∗(s) > 0 for some s eliminates the unusual possibility that
the technology τ is not eﬃcient even as brand new. The assumption w∗(¯ s) = 1 means that (11) is
violated for some machines that would be in use if there were no free endowments.
8 The second fact follows from the measurability of the set {(τ,s) : f(τ)−v(τ +s)g(τ) > 0}, which is implied by
the assumptions.
9Though the obtained result is not spectacular (since it is rather intuitive), the formal analysis that we perform
allows to strictly deﬁne the assumptions that are necessary for its validity.
10This means that at its points of discontinuity the function d(τ,·) is continuous either from the left or from the
right.
10Proof. The optimal control i∗ is characterized by equations (7) and (8). Due to (6) the adjoint
equation takes the form
˙ ξ(s) = (r + δ)ξ(s) − χ(f(τ) − v(τ + s)g(τ)), ξ(ω) = 0, (14)
with χ(x) = x for x > 0 and χ(x) = 0 for x ≤ 0.
The integrand in (10) is non-diﬀerentiable with respect to the state variable k, which does not
allow to apply the classical Pontryagin maximum principle to this problem. Therefore, we apply
a non-smooth version of the maximum principle involving the subdiﬀerential of the integrand (see
e.g. Theorem 6E.1 in Loewen, 1993).
Denote
L(s,k,w) = f(τ)kw − v(τ + s)max{0, g(τ)kw − d(τ,s)}, ˆ L(s,k) = max
w∈[0,1]
L(s,k,w).







ˆ L(s,k(s)) − C(s,i(s))
 
ds,
subject to (5). As a consequence of Theorem 6E.1 in Loewen, 1993 (the assumptions of this theorem
are easy to check in our case), there exists an absolutely continuous function ξd : [s0(τ),ω] → R
such that
˙ ξd(s) ∈ (r + δ)ξd(s) − ∂kˆ L(s,k(s)), ξd(ω) = 0, (15)
and the optimal control i∗(s) in the problem (10), (5) is given by (7) with ξd substituted for ξ∗. The
subdiﬀerential ∂kˆ L of ˆ L with respect to k can be understood in the sense of the convex analysis,
since ˆ L is a concave function. In order to calculate ∂kL we denote σ(s) = f(τ) − v(τ + s)g(τ) and





1 if k ∈ [0,d(τ,s)/g(τ)]
1 if k > d(τ,s)/g(τ) and σ(s) ≥ 0,
d(τ,s)/kg(τ) if k > d(τ,s)/g(τ) and σ(s) < 0.
From here we immediately see that ˆ w(s,k) ≥ w∗(s) for every s and k, therefore the last inequality
in (13) holds true.





f(τ)k if k ∈ [0,d(τ,s)/g(τ)]
f(τ)d(τ,s)/g(τ) if k > d(τ,s)/g(τ) and σ(s) < 0,
σ(s)k + v(τ + s)d(τ,s) if k > d(τ,s)/g(τ) and σ(s) ≥ 0.
Then we obtain the following formula for the subdiﬀerential depending on the sign of σ(s):




f(τ) for k ∈ [0,d(τ,s)/g(τ)),
[0,f(τ)] for k = d(τ,s)/g(τ),
0 for k > d(τ,s)/g(τ),
(16)




f(τ) for k ∈ [0,d(τ,s)/g(τ)),
[σ(s),f(τ)] for k = d(τ,s)/g(τ),
σ(s) for k > d(τ,s)/g(τ),
(17)
Now we can compare the two adjoint equations (14) and (15). We shall check that for any value of
k and any element l ∈ ∂kˆ L(s,k) it holds that
l ≥ χ(σ(s)). (18)
Indeed, if χ(σ(s)) = 0, then we have l ≥ 0 according to the ﬁrst formula for ∂kˆ L(s,k). Notice that
the inequality is strict if k ∈ [0,d(τ,s)/g(τ)).
If χ(σ(s)) > 0 then from the formula for ∂kL(s,k) in this case we verify again (18). Again, the
inequality is strict if k ∈ [0,d(τ,s)/g(τ)) and v(τ + s) > 0.
The relation (18) implies that at points s at which ξ∗(s) = ξd(s) and the two derivatives exist, the
inequality ˙ ξ∗(s) ≥ ˙ ξd(s) holds true. Due to the end point conditions, ξ∗(ω) = ξd(ω). Then a standard
argument implies that ξd(s) ≥ ξ∗(s) for all s. Due to (7) this inequality implies id(s) ≥ i∗(s) and
the respective inequalities for the capital stock and the emissions.
To prove claim (ii) by contradiction we assume that kd(s) ≤ k∗(s) (hence kd(s) = k∗(s)) for every
s, and let ¯ s be the number assumed to exist in the formulation of the proposition. Then
g(τ)kd(¯ s) < d(τ, ¯ s),
and this holds in a (possibly one-sided) neighbourhood of ¯ s. Then according to (16) and (17) we
have ∂kˆ L(s,kd(s)) = {f(τ)} independently of the sign of σ(s). Due to the assumed property of v,
this implies ˙ ξd(s) < ˙ ξ∗(s) at any point from a neighbourhood of ¯ s at which ξd(s) = ξ∗(s). This
implies in a standard way that ξd(s′) > ξ∗(s′) for some s′ < ¯ s and suﬃciently close to ¯ s. From (18) it
follows that the same inequality holds for all s ∈ [s0(τ),s′]. Since i∗(s) > 0 close to s0(τ) we obtain
from (7) and the assumptions for C that id(s) > i∗(s) for all suﬃciently small s ≥ s0(τ). Hence, the
same inequality applies for kd(s) and k∗(s). We obtain a contradiction with the assumption that
kd(s) ≤ k∗(s) for all s. This implies that kd(s) > k∗(s) for some s, and necessarily id(s) > i∗(s) for
some s. Q.E.D.
The overall solution at the ﬁrm level resulting from a distribution d of the free endowment is
Id(τ,s) = id(s), Wd(τ,s) = wd(s), Kd(τ,s) = kd(s), (19)
where (id,wd,kd) is the solution of (10), (5) for the respective τ. Then the emission of the ﬁrm at




g(τ)Kd(τ,t − τ)Wd(τ,t − τ)dτ,
while the emission for the optimal solution (I∗,W∗,K∗) is given in a similar way by (3).
12Corollary 1 Assume that the ﬁrm has distributed the free endowments in such a way that claim
(ii) of Proposition 2 holds. Then for the emission at the optimal solution, Ed(t), it holds that
Ed(t) ≥ E∗(t) ∀t > 0,
and the inequality is strict in a non-degenerate time interval.
The proof follows from the established relations between the solutions and the inequality g(τ) > 0.
The corollary states that, if the ﬁrm does not use its free endowment optimally (in the sense deﬁned
just before proposition 1), then its emission level will be higher, for some t, than under a tax regime
(where permit price and tax coincide) or without free endowment. This result is important because it
shows that giving some permits for free to the ﬁrm raises challenging problems about the way these
free permits are used. It challenges the common knowledge that the way permits are distributed
does not matter for eﬃciency.
Further, a non-optimal distribution d may aﬀect not only the ﬁrm’s emission level, but also the
average age of machines. However, it is easy to argue that a non-optimal distribution d may lead
to either modernization (lower average age) or to older capital stock, depending on the particular
choice of d. If (11) is violated dominantly for old ages s, then the non-optimal distribution would
lead to higher average age of machines. If (11) is violated dominantly for young ages s the average
age would be lower than in the case of an optimal distribution. It is interesting to see that giving
permits for free is not necessarily an eﬃcient way of modernizing the capital structure. Actually,
the eﬀect can go in the two directions. It just depends on how the endowment is split among the
machines.
4 The equilibrium price of tradable permits
In this section we consider an economy with a cap on global emissions and a market for tradable
emission permits (cap-and-trade system). Market equilibrium will set the permit price. By doing
this we now endogenize the price v. The economy consists of n ﬁrms, each of which is described by
the model considered in Section 2, but with ﬁrm-speciﬁc data δ, f, g, C, K0, indexed further by
the subscript i for i = 1,...,n. Let ˆ E(t) be a cap on global emissions in the economy for t ≥ ˆ t. As
before, we assume that the cap enters into force at time ˆ t > 0, which is known by the ﬁrms at time
t = 0 for all the future. For technical convenience we further assume that ˆ t ≥ ω, although this is
not essential for the obtained results.
The global amount of emission permits ˆ E(t) is issued at time ˆ t for all the future. Like in the previous
section, some permits are auctioned, some others are given for free to the ﬁrms. So there will be
some trading between the ﬁrms on the secondary market, which however takes place at the same
13time t = ˆ t due to the perfect foresight. According to Proposition 1(i) the optimal solutions of the
ﬁrms are independent of the endowment, therefore the emission of each of them for any given price






i [v](τ,t − τ)W∗




i [v]) is the optimal solution for the i-th ﬁrm (without free endowment) for a
given v (the case of non-optimal utilization of the endowments will be investigated in Section 6).
Then the equation for the market price, v(t), of emissions at the combined primary and secondary
market is
E∗
1[v](t) + ... + E∗
n[v](t) = ˆ E(t), t ≥ ˆ t. (21)
The solution of this equation is sought in the space V of all measurable and locally bounded
functions v : [0,∞)  → R that equal zero on [0,ˆ t).
The following cases may appear, in general:
(i) equation (21) does not have a solution v( ) ∈ V;
(ii) a solution exists but is not unique;
(iii) a unique solution exists but is not positive for all t;
(iv) an unique strictly positive solution exists.
Only in the case (iv) equation (21) determines a market price; all other cases indicate a market
failure.
In general, all of the above cases may appear. To avoid (i) one needs assumptions for the data, and
these assumptions are diﬃcult to specify due to the complexity of equation (21).
The second case obviously takes place if, for example, ˆ E(t) ≡ 0, since if v is a solution of (21),
then every ˜ v with ˜ v(t) > v(t) would also be a solution. Even if the above two possibilities could be
classiﬁed as “academic”, the third case could be rather realistic.
A study of the market equation (21) is presented in a companion paper in the conference proceeding
(see Br´ echet, Tsachev and Veliov, 2009). Below we summarize some of the results obtained there,
in particular those that will be used in the rest of the present paper. Lemma 2 below is not included
in Br´ echet, Tsachev and Veliov (2009); therefore we supply it with a proof.
We start with two properties of the emission map
v( ) −→ E∗[v](t) :=
  t
t−ω
g(τ)K∗[v](τ,t − τ)W∗[v](τ,t − τ)dτ,
where (I∗[v],W∗[v],K∗[v]) is the optimal solution of the ﬁrm’s (without endowment) corresponding
to price function v.
14Lemma 1 ([Lemma 1], Br´ echet, Tsachev and Veliov, 2009) For every v ∈ V and t ≥ ˆ t the value
E∗[v](t) depends only on the restriction of v to [t − ω,t + ω].
Lemma 2 Let v1, v2 ∈ V and v1(t) ≤ v2(t) for (almost) every t ≥ ¯ t. Then E∗[v1](t) ≥ E∗[v2](t)
for every t ≥ 0.
Proof. Expression (6) implies W∗[v1](τ,s) ≥ W∗[v2](τ,s) for almost all (τ,s) ∈ [−ω,T]×[s0(τ),ω]
and (8) implies for the solutions corresponding to v1 and v2 that ξ[v1](s) ≥ ξ[v2](s) for all (τ,s) ∈
[−ω,T]×[s0(τ),ω]. The last inequality together with (7) and the monotonicity of (C′
i)−1 imply that
I∗[v1](τ,s) ≥ I∗[v2](τ,s) for all (τ,s) as above. Using (1), we obtain K∗[v1](τ,s) ≥ K∗[v2](τ,s).
The inequalities for W∗[vi], and K∗[vi], i = 1, 2, together with (3) imply E[v1](t) ≥ E[v2](t) for all
t ≥ 0. Q.E.D.





assuming, in addition, that for the solution v of (21) it holds for each ﬁrms i that fi(τ)−v(t)gi(τ) ≥ 0
for τ ≥ 0 and t ∈ (τ,τ + ω). The last means that the price v(t) does not invoke switch-oﬀ of
existing machines, hence the environmental goals can be achieved optimally only by appropriate
investment policies (without premature scrapping). The last assumption is quite realistic in view
of the possibility to buy old machines at low price instead of buying new machines and scrap them
when the emission cap becomes stringent.
In this case the following lemma holds.
Lemma 3 [4, Lemma 3] Then for every t ≥ ˆ t
E∗







    α
t−ω g2
i (τ)κi(t,τ,α − τ)dτ if α ∈ [t − ω,t],
e−(r+δi)(α−t)   t
α−ω g2







and a ∨ b = max{a,b}, a ∧ b = min{a,b}.
15Notice that E∗
i [0](t) is the optimal emission of the i-th ﬁrm if there is no cost of emission at all (no
emission restriction).
Using this lemma we may rewrite the market equation (21) in the form
  t+ω
ˆ t∨(t−ω)




i [0](t) and Φ(t,α) =
 n
i=1 ϕi(t,α). The right-hand side represents the
targeted reduction of emissions, which is the diﬀerence between the total emission of the industry at
its optimal operation without any environmental constraints and the emission cap. The expression
in the left-hand side represents the emission reduction resulting from optimal operation of the ﬁrms
facing emission price v. The market price v should balance the two quantities.
The above simpliﬁed form of the market equation is still rather complicated and deserves some
additional comments. Equation (23) is a Fredholm integral equation of the ﬁrst kind on the inﬁnite
interval [ˆ t,+∞). Such equations are inherently ill-posed. To see that it is enough to add to a
solution v a highly ﬂuctuating term, such as sin(nt). Then v(t) + sin(nt) would be a solution of
the same equation with the right-hand side modiﬁed by the quantity
  t+ω
ˆ t∨(t−ω) Φ(t,α)sin(nα)dα,
which is arbitrarily small when n is large enough. Thus an arbitrarily small disturbance in the
right-hand side can lead to a ﬁnite (even arbitrarily large) change of the solution. This diﬃculty
is caused by the smoothing eﬀect on v of the integration with Φ: high-frequency components of
v are “smoothed out”. Therefore one can expect that computing v would tend to amplify any
high-frequency component or irregularity of the right-hand side. In eﬀect, the right-hand side of
(23) has to be somewhat “smoother” than the solution v in order to obtain satisfactory numerical
approximation (see Hansen, 1992).
A good numerical method to solve a Fredholm integral equation of the ﬁrst kind should be able to
somehow ﬁlter out the high-frequency components in the singular value expansion of the solution
(if such exists). Diﬀerent methods of regularization aimed at ﬁnding reasonable numerical approxi-
mation to the solution are known, e.g. Tikhonov and Arsenin (1977), Delves and Mohamed (1985)
and Kress (1989). However, we stress that our aim is not just to solve the price equation (21). Our
ultimate goal is to imitate the behavior of the auction market, therefore the regularization we apply
for solving (21) should be implementable also in the real auction market. We argue below that a
relevant regularization tool is to formulate the emission constraint (21) period-wise, rather than
at any time instant. This amounts to applying regularization by time-aggregation, related to the
Nystr¨ om’s method [8, Chapter 12]. In contrast to the celebrated singular expansion/decomposition
this method is directly applicable also in the general (nonlinear) case of (21) and has a clear policy
implementation.
Namely, we introduce the discrete version of the emission mapping E∗ as follows. Assume that an




ˆ E(t)dt is the cap on emissions over
the time-period [tk−1,tk]. For simplicity we assume that all time periods have the same length
16h > 0, thus tk = kh, and also that ω = mh, ˆ t = ˆ kh for appropriate natural numbers m and ˆ k.11
Correspondingly, the price of emission will be constant, vk, on each interval [tk−1,tk) and zero for
k ≤ ˆ k. Thus instead of the space V of price functions we consider
Vh = {(v1,v2,...) : vk ∈ (−∞,+∞), vk = 0 for k ≤ ˆ k},
which can be viewed as a subset of V by piece-wise constant embedding of Vh in V. The emission
of the i-th ﬁrm resulting from v ∈ Vh becomes a vector E∗h












i [v](τ,t − τ)W∗
i [v](τ,t − τ)dτ dt. (24)




i,k[v] = ˆ Eh
k, k ≥ ˆ k. (25)
for v ∈ Vh.
The last equation is studied in more details in Br´ echet, Tsachev and Veliov (2009),Section 4.
In particular an existence result is proved and the regularizing role of the commitment period
to the market equation is numerically demonstrated. The essence is, that for a suﬃciently large
commitment period the discrete market equation (25) may have a unique positive solution (that is,
it determines a marked price of emissions) although the “continuous” market equation (21) does
not have a positive solution (that is, the “continuous” market fails to determine a price). Moreover,
a larger commitment period better attenuates the high oscillations of the market price that appear
for small h.
For illustration we reproduce two ﬁgures from Br´ echet, Tsachev and Veliov (2009) which correspond
to an industry consisting of equal ﬁrms. The detailed speciﬁcation are given in Br´ echet, Tsachev
and Veliov (2009), Section 5.
In the ﬁgures below the plotted time horizon is 80 years. In Fig. 1 and Fig. 2 the emission cap
imposed at time t = 30 is ﬁrst constant, starting from the emission level before the beginning of the
emission restriction, then it decreases quadratically. The dash-dotted line in the left plot of Fig. 1
represents the unrestricted emissions, E∗[0], whereas the solid line represents the emission of the
ﬁrms obeying the cap.
The right plot in Fig. 1 represents the permit price. It is obtained by using short commitment
periods of h = 1 year. The market fails in two time periods. First, this happens immediately after
the introduction of the emission cap at time ˆ t = 30. Then it appends again when the shape of
11 Following the terminology used under the Kyoto protocol of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change,
we shall call h a commitment period. The current commitment period is ﬁve-year long, covering 2008 to 2012.
17the cap is modiﬁed at time t = 50: the solution of the market equation (21) takes negative values.
In addition, the solution is highly oscillating around these time periods. The regularization of the
market by adopting longer commitment periods is displayed on Fig. 2. The left plot corresponds
to commitment periods of h = 5 years. The market still fails immediately after the introduction
of the cap, but not around the change of the shape of the cap. The right plot in Fig. 2 represents
the permit price with commitment periods of 10 years. Clearly the market is now fully eﬃcient
and looks quite regular. These numerical examples shows how the market for tradable permits is
sensitive to the length of the commitment periods.12 It also provides a rational to the result of
Hintermann (2010), that the allowance price in the EU-ETS was not driven by marginal abatement
cost determinants (with the possible exception of gas prices) before the ﬁrst round of emissions
accounting in April 2006, thus violating a necessary condition for a permit market to be an eﬃcient
policy instrument.









dash−dotted line − without emission cap;           
thick line − with emission cap imposed             
   from year 31 on, being flat till year 50        
   and afterwards decreasing quadratically         
   to the level of 300 in year 90.                 
emissions 









"market price" for the case of emission cap
imposed from year 31 on, being flat till year 50
and afterwards decreasing quadratically 
to the level of 300 in year 90.     
"market price" 
time 
Figure 1: Emissions (left) and a solution to the price equation (21) (right) resulting from an emission
restriction posed at time t = 30 .













"market price" for the case of emission cap      
imposed from year 31 on over 5−year−periods,     
being flat till year 50, decreasing quadratically
to the annual level of 300 in year 90 and        
being equal to 300 annually afterwards.          











market price for the case of emission cap     
imposed from year 31 on over 10−year−periods, 
being flat till year 50, decreasing           
quadratically to the annual level of          
300 in year 90 and being equal to             
300 annually afterwards.                      
market price 
time 
Figure 2: Auction price of emission permits for commitment periods h = 5 years (left) and h = 10
years (right).
12Let us recall that the Kyoto protocol established 5-year commitment periods.
185 The anticipation eﬀect
In this section we address the following question: will the ﬁrms in the economy facing emission re-
strictions eﬀective from time ˆ t change their investment decisions even before time ˆ t? Two competing
arguments are at stake. On one hand, early emission abatement is costly for the ﬁrm. But, on the
other hand, because of adjustment costs, a sharp emission reduction (when the cap is enforced) can
also be very costly. So what is the optimal mix between these two arguments? The answer to this
question is that there exists an anticipation eﬀect. We prove this eﬀect and illustrate it numerically
provided that the market does not fail to determine the permit price shortly after the enforcement
period ˆ t.
The next proposition claims that the emission cap introduced at time ˆ t decreases the investments
of the ﬁrms even before time ˆ t if the ﬁrms are informed about the introduction of the cap before ˆ t.
This is proved under the assumption that the market equation (21) (or its period-wise version (25))
determines a positive market price ˆ v(t) for t ≥ ˆ t. For simplicity we assume that ﬁrms are symmetric
(the subscript i in (21) is skipped). So we want to compare the solution (I∗[ˆ v],W∗[ˆ v],K∗[ˆ v]) for
the case of emission cap ˆ E with that for absence of a cap, (I∗[0],W∗[0],K∗[0]) (clearly zero price
of emission, v = 0 means that the emission is unrestricted).
Proposition 3 Assume that the market price ˆ v(t) > 0 exists for t > ˆ t and that for some vintages
τ < ˆ t of positive measure there is s1(τ) > s0(τ) such that I∗[0](τ,s) > 0 for s ∈ [s0(τ),s1(τ)].
Then there exists a set D ⊂ {[0,ˆ t) × [0,ω]} of positive measure such that I∗[ˆ v](τ,s) < I∗[0](τ,s)
for (τ,s) ∈ D, while I∗[ˆ v](τ,s) ≤ I∗[0](τ,s) for all (τ,s).
Proof. The adjoint equations for a τ ∈ [ˆ t − ω,ˆ t] for the problem with a price ˆ v of the emission
and for zero price are correspondingly
˙ ˆ ξ = (r + δ)ˆ ξ − (f(τ) − ˆ v(τ + s)g(τ)) ˆ w∗(s), ˆ ξ(ω) = 0,
˙ ξ = (r + δ)ξ − f(τ), ξ(ω) = 0,
where ˆ w∗(s) = W∗[ˆ v](τ,s). Comparing the right-hand sides we obtain that ξ(s) ≥ ˆ ξ(s) for all s,
which implies the last claim of the proposition according to (7) and the monotonicity of (C′)−1
ensured by (A2). The ﬁrst claim is implied by the same argument, using the additional informa-
tion that the right-hand side of the equation for ˆ ξ is strictly larger than that for ξ for ages s of
positive measure (and for vintages τ < ˆ t of positive measure). The latter follows from the fact
that W∗[ˆ v](τ,s) = 1 for (τ,s) ∈ [0,ˆ t) × [0,min{ˆ t − τ,ω}), the assumption for I∗[0], the fact that
I∗[0]( ,s) is nondecreasing in τ (because of the equation for ξ, the monotonicity of f( ) in τ and
(7) together with the strict monotonicity of (C′)−1) and, again, because of (7) together with the
strict monotonicity of (C′)−1. Q.E.D.
19The same claim (with the same proof) applies to the period-wise market price obtained from (25).
We illustrate the anticipation eﬀect by the following example (the details speciﬁcations are given
in [4, Section 5]). Let us take ˆ E(t) constant, with value ˆ E = 300, which is strictly smaller than the
quantity that the ﬁrms would have emitted without regulation, E∗[0](ˆ t).
On Figure 3 (left plot) we observe that the emission starts to decline downwards from the unre-
stricted emission much earlier than ˆ t = 30 (about time t = 15). This is a consequence of lower
investment levels even before time ˆ t (the anticipation eﬀect).









dash−dotted line − emissions up to year 41 
      without emissions’ cap being imposed;
thick line − emissions with emissions’ cap 
      at 300 from year 31 on;           
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market price of emissions with 
emissions’ cap imposed 
from year 31 on.     
time 
market price 
Figure 3: Emission resulting from an emission restriction posed at time t = 30 (left) and the
corresponding market price of permits (right).
6 Equilibrium eﬀects of the non-optimal use of the free endow-
ments
This last section presents one of the most interesting ﬁndings in this paper. Namely, a non-optimal
use of the free endowment by some ﬁrms brings disadvantages not only for this ﬁrm (in terms of
cost and emissions) but also for all the other ﬁrms involved in the market for emission permits.
This contamination eﬀect goes through the permit price in equilibrium.
Again, for simplicity we consider an economy consisting of two initially identical ﬁrms. These two
ﬁrms are endowed with two diﬀerent permits endowments, D1(t) and D2(t), given to the ﬁrst and to
the second ﬁrm, respectively. It is assumed that ﬁrm 2 uses its free endowment in an optimal way.
According to Proposition 1, the optimal solution (I∗
2[v],W∗
2 [v],K∗
2[v]) for this ﬁrm is independent
of its free endowment D2(t), for any market price v(t). The corresponding emission level equals
E∗








20On the other hand, let us assume that ﬁrm 1 distributes its free endowment among its diﬀerent












Then the market price equation becomes
Ed
1[v](t) + E∗
2[v](t) = ˆ E(t), t ≥ ˆ t.
(Obviously this equation coincides with (21) if ﬁrm 1 uses its free endowment optimally, since in
this case Ed
1[v] = E∗




2[v](t) = ˆ E(t) − (Ed
1[v](t) − E∗
1[v](t)) =: ˜ E(t).




Assume the ﬁrst ﬁrm does not use its free endowment D1(t) optimally, so that claim (ii) of Propo-
sition 2 holds for vd. According to Corollary 1, the last inequality is strict on some time intervals.
Thus v∗ and vd satisfy for t ≥ ˆ t the equations
E∗
1[v∗](t) + E∗
2[v∗](t) = ˆ E(t), (26)
E∗
1[vd](t) + E∗
2[vd](t) = ˜ E(t) (27)
and
ˆ E(t) ≥ ˜ E(t), (28)
where the inequality is strict for some t of positive measure. That is, if one ﬁrm does not use its free
endowment optimally it would create in the market for permits the same eﬀect as if the emission
cap were be lower ( ˜ E(t) instead of ˆ E(t)). In other words, the non-optimal use of free endowments
by some ﬁrms aﬀects negatively the supply side of the market of permits. The basic intuition would
suggest that a lower emission cap would imply a higher market price for emissions. However, in our
dynamic vintage framework this is not necessarily the case. Figure 4 provides a comparison of the
two market prices (right plot) resulting from an emission caps at t = 30 (left plot). Although one
of the caps is above the other for all t > ˆ t = 30, the expected inequality for the respective market
prices is violated for some values of t. In other words, a more stringent emission cap can lead to
a lower equilibrium price at some time periods. This eﬀect should not be considered as typical. In
the example presented by Figure 4 the “abnormal” price behavior occurs shortly after the “kink”
of the emission cap and is caused by the latter circumstance rather than by the relation between
the size of the caps. The next proposition shows that the intuitive argument stated above has its
formal ground.













the higher emission cap, imposed     
at t=30 over one−year periods        
the lower emission cap,              
imposed at t=30 over one−year periods
                                     













caused by the lower emission 
cap, imposed at t=30       
caused by the higher emission 
cap, imposed at t=30        
Figure 4: Two emission caps (left) and the corresponding equilibrium prices (right).
Proposition 4 Assume that the solutions v∗ and vd of equations (26) and (27) exist on t ∈ (ˆ t,+∞)
(not necessarily positive). If (28) is fulﬁlled as strict inequality on a set of positive measure around
a point ˜ t > ˆ t, then vd(t) > v∗(t) on a subset of positive measure around [˜ t − ω,˜ t + ω].13
Proof. If for every ε > 0 we assume that vd(t) ≤ v∗(t) a.e. on (˜ t − ω − ε,˜ t + ω + ε) ∩ [ˆ t,∞), then
E∗
i [v∗](t) ≤ E∗
i [vd] on (˜ t − ε,˜ t + ε) ∩ [ˆ t,∞) according to Lemma 1 and Lemma 2. Then (26), (27)
imply ˆ E(t) ≤ ˜ E(t) on (˜ t − ε,˜ t + ε) ∩ [ˆ t,∞). This contradicts the assumption in the proposition.
Q.E.D.
Proposition 4 shows that if one of the two ﬁrms does not use its free endowment optimally, then the
other ﬁrm will suﬀer from a higher market price, regardless of the fact that it has allocated its free
endowment in an optimal way. This latter ﬁrm will be pushed to abate more than what is optimal,
just because the other ﬁrm does not use optimally its free endowments. The market for tradable
emission permits thus generates a pecuniary externality among the ﬁrms. Furthermore, the ﬁrm
that does not behave optimally will suﬀer twice. First, it pollutes more than what is optimal, which
is costly. Second, because of market equilibrium, it also faces a higher equilibrium price for tradable
permits that it needs, at least for some time periods.
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